By
defining certain subjects as forbidden, discourse functions to
control thought. If certain concepts cannot be spoken about, they can
be removed entirely from consciousness. Moreau
forbids Prendick from speaking about the possibility of injury or
death befalling the Ones with the Whips, because they cannot allow
the Beast-Men to conceive of the idea. By speaking about it,
it becomes a possibility; unspoken, it cannot exist.
With
regard to how one can speak, certain
types of language are proscribed. Anything that threatens to erode
the boundary between man and beast is punished harshly: "'None,
none,' said the Ape-man, -- 'none escape. See! I did a little thing,
a wrong thing, once. I jabbered, jabbered, stopped talking. None
could understand'" (2). Discourse
separates man from beast and defines what is human. Prendick’s
first objection to the notion that the men he meets have originated
from beasts is that he has heard them use language: "But...these
things -- these animals talk!" (3). Ritual also functions on a
meta-discursive level through "the Law". Repetition of the Law is
how the Beast-Men hold themselves to the behaviours it prescribes:
the very act of saying the Law aloud is at once a reminder about how
to behave and an affirmation of their status as a law-abiding
language-speaker, a subject of the discourse: "Punishment is sharp
and sure. Therefore learn the Law. Say the words" (4).
Ritual
feeds into privilege. Who may speak? Only men may speak. If one
speaks, one is a man: if one gibbers, one is a beast: "He says
nothing," said the Satyr. "Men have voices" (5).
Within the novel, Latin functions as a privileged discourse: Prendick
and Moreau use it to exclude the Beast-Men from their communication.
Privilege also functions to
enshrine Moreau (the
originator of the language, the one who defines meaning, and dictates "what", "how" and "who") as the centre of power. Once
Moreau is gone, the first sign of their reversion into beast-nature
is the loss of language:
It was about May when I first distinctly perceived a growing difference in their speech and carriage, a growing coarseness of articulation, a growing disinclination to talk. My Monkey-man's jabber multiplied in volume but grew less and less comprehensible, more and more simian. Some of the others seemed altogether slipping their hold upon speech, though they still understood what I said to them at that time. (Can you imagine language, once clear-cut and exact, softening and guttering, losing shape and import, becoming mere limps of sound again?) (6).
One
interesting aspect of ritual in the novel is how on a meta-discursive
level the gap between signifier and signified is described. The
monkey-man, by virtue, one supposes, of his closer genetic
relationship to humanity, is able to employ language on a level that
is at once more sophisticated and more absurd than the base
communication level employed by the other beast-people.
The Monkey-man ... was for ever jabbering at me, -- jabbering the most arrant nonsense. One thing about him entertained me a little: he had a fantastic trick of coining new words. He had an idea, I believe, that to gabble about names that meant nothing was the proper use of speech (7).
Written
language functions at level above social discourse, because some
elements of the dynamic relationship between interlocutors is
removed. At the end of the book, Prendick,
aware of the eroded border between man and beast, describes human
speech in non-verbal animalistic terms: people "mew" and "gibber". It is in the language of books that he finds real
humanity. All beasts communicate with one another though non-verbal
means. Communication within a society functions through a shared
discourse. Removing these bestial elements of communication
leaves pure language. So Prendick turns to books written by long-dead
authors as a more purely human endeavour: he "spend[s] [his] days
surrounded by wise books, -- bright windows in this life of ours, lit
by the shining souls of men" (8).
Notes:
1)
Foucault, 149.
2)
Wells, chapter 12.
3)
Wells, chapter 14.
4)
Wells, chapter 12.
5)
Wells, chapter 16.
6)
Wells, chapter 21.
7)
Wells, chapter 21.
8)
Wells, chapter 22.
Works
cited:
Foucault,
Michel. “The Discourse on Language”. Critical Theory Since 1965.
Eds. Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle. Tallahassee: Florida State
University Press, 1986. 148-162.
Wells,
Herbert George. The Island of Dr Moreau. Project Gutenberg: Oct 14
2004. Web. Sep 3 2012.
Those are fascinating observations! Thanks for sharing.
ReplyDeleteThanks, Rachel!
ReplyDelete